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IF IT’S BROKEN, LET THEM FIX IT: WHY THE
GEBSER PRE-LITIGATION NOTICE REQUIREMENT
SHOULD APPLY TO TITLE IX ATHLETICS
LAWSUITS
Zachary Swartz+
“With regard to athletics, I have to say, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I had not realized until the comment period closed that the most
important issue in the United States today is intercollegiate athletics.”1 Caspar
Weinberger,2 then-Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), made this tongue-in-cheek comment during HEW’s efforts to
implement Title IX—the federal statute that prohibits recipients of federal
funding from discriminating “on the basis of sex” with regard to “any
education program or activity.”3 In making this statement, Secretary
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fellow evening law students for their support and his colleagues on the Catholic University Law
Review for their invaluable assistance throughout the publication process.
1. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 94th Cong. 439 (1975) (statement of Caspar W.
Weinberger, Secretary, Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare).
2. Caspar Weinberger was an influential political figure with an interesting background. A
graduate of Harvard Law School and a veteran of the United States Army, Weinberger was
elected to the California State Assembly in 1952. SecDef Histories – Caspar W. Weinberger,
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/specials/secdef_histories/bios/weinberger.htm (last
visited July 15, 2012). Weinberger came to Washington, D.C. in 1970 to serve as chair of the
Federal Trade Commission. Id. He later became the deputy director (from 1970 to 1972) and the
director (from 1972 to 1973) of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (from 1973 to 1975). Id. During his time in
Washington, Weinberger became well known for his cost-cutting abilities, earning him the
nickname “Cap the Knife.” Id. Weinberger is most prominently known, however, for his service
as the Secretary of Defense under President Ronald Regan from 1981 to 1987. Id. Belying his
nickname, then-Congressman Al Gore dubbed Weinberger “Cap the Ladle” for his support of
large increases to the defense budget while at the Pentagon. James Kelly, More a Ladle than a
Knife, TIME, Dec. 20, 1982, at 14–15.
3. Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). The Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) promulgated regulations to implement Title IX. See
DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS
REVOLUTION 18–19 (2010). HEW received approximately 10,000 written comments on the
proposed Title IX regulations relating to the statute’s applicability to intercollegiate athletics. Id.
at 21. This is what prompted a “bemused” Secretary Weinberger to make the above-quoted
statement. Ellen Staurowsky, Title IX in its Third Decade: The Commission on Opportunity in
Athletics, 2 ENT. LAW. 70, 73–74 (2003).
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Weinberger was, in all likelihood, being facetious.4 Nonetheless, Title IX has
had a stunning impact on intercollegiate athletics. In the 40 years since its
enactment, the statute, its implementing regulations, and the case law
interpreting Title IX have continued to be a source of conflict.5 This Note
addresses one of these sources of conflicts—whether an allegation of gender
discrimination in the athletics context should require pre-litigation notice and
an opportunity to cure before a plaintiff may recover monetary damages.6
Resolution of this issue has important policy ramifications. Failing to apply a
pre-litigation notice and opportunity-to-cure requirement to Title IX athletics
lawsuits could subvert the very purpose of the statute by diverting funding
from reducing gender discrimination in education to defending and paying
large legal-damages awards.7
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, it has required
pre-litigation notice and an opportunity to cure in the context of
In Gebser v. Lago Vista
teacher-student sexual harassment cases.8
Independent School District, the Supreme Court addressed a clear violation of
Title IX: a high school teacher had engaged in sexual relations with one of his
students.9 Nonetheless, the Court did not permit the plaintiff to recover
damages because she had not notified the defendant school district of the
discrimination nor provided the school district the opportunity to rectify the
discrimination.10 In essence, the Court in Gebser established a higher
threshold of proof for the plaintiff in order to recover damages in Title IX
cases involving allegations of teacher-student sexual harassment.11

4. See BRAKE, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that Secretary Weinberger’s comments were
made “with a tinge of sarcasm”). Secretary Weinberger’s statement is particularly striking given
its timing, as Richard Nixon had resigned as president just a year before Weinberger’s comment.
Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1974, at A1. Moreover, the Vietnam
War had recently ended. Gabriel Kolko, Lesson from a Total Defeat for the US: The End of the
(May
1,
2005),
Vietnam
War,
30
Years
Ago,
COUNTERPUNCH
http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/05/ 01/the-end-of-the-vietnam-war-30-years-ago/.
5. See, e.g., Michael Rietmulder, Title IX Controversy Continues, MINN. DAILY, April 14,
2010, at 1.
6. See, e.g., Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats
Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 551, 612–13 (2003) (asking whether “educational institutions [would] be shielded from
possible Title IX liability because the student or prospective student-athlete did not inform the
proper authority of the failure to provide equal opportunity in the selection of sports or benefits”).
7. See infra Part III.D.
8. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
9. Id. at 277–78. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme Court had
already established that “a school district can be held liable in damages in cases involving a
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student.” 503 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1992).
10. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 292–93.
11. Id.
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The Gebser decision left a number of questions unanswered.12 It comes as
no surprise, then, that a circuit split has emerged over the question of whether
the Gebser notice requirement should be expanded to apply to Title IX
athletics suits.13 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have held that
Gebser’s pre-litigation notice and opportunity to cure requirement do not apply
to Title IX athletics suits,14 whereas the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit has held that this requirement does apply to such suits.15
This Note argues that the Gebser pre-litigation notice and opportunity to
cure requirements should apply to Title IX athletics suits. First, this Note
traces the development of Title IX generally, addressing the jurisprudential
principles applicable to Title IX as a statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s
power under the Spending Clause, the statute’s sole administrative
enforcement mechanism, and the judicial creation of a private right of action.
Next, this Note examines Gebser and highlights the circuit split over whether
Gebser should apply to Title IX lawsuits alleging unequal provision of
intercollegiate athletic opportunities. Lastly, this Note analyzes the circuit
court opinions in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence and the purpose of Title
IX and concludes that Gebser’s notice and opportunity to cure requirement
should be applied to Title IX athletics lawsuits for legal and policy reasons.

12. See Heckman, supra note 6, at 612–13 (discussing the questions left unanswered after
Gebser). These questions ranged from whether Gebser “requires all individuals to place the
offending educational institutions on notice in Title IX cases, even when not pursuing a sexual
harassment claim,” to “who would be required to be informed and what serves as sufficient
notice,” to whether “educational institutions [would] be shielded from possible Title IX liability”
because the wrong authority was informed. Id.
13. Compare Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that Gebser’s pre-litigation notice and opportunity to cure requirement do not apply to
Title IX athletics suits) and Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 864 (5th Cir. 2000)
(coming to similar conclusion), with Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir.
2001) (holding that Gebser’s requirements apply to Title IX athletics suits). See also Diane
Heckman, The Entrenchment of the Glass Sneaker Ceiling: Excavating Forty-Five Years of Sex
Discrimination Involving Educational Athletic Employment Based on Title VII, Title IX, and the
Equal Pay Act, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 429, 449 (2011) (“[W]hether an employee of an
educational institution would also be required to place the educational institution on notice that an
employment-related violation occurred as a condition precedent to the commencement of a Title
IX lawsuit not involving sexual harassment or in a Title IX case involving retaliation is
unclear.”).
14. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968; Pederson, 213 F.3d at 882.
15. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 576.
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I. TRACING THE STATUTORY AND LEGAL HISTORY OF TITLE IX
A. The Passage of Title IX
Congress enacted Title IX in response to a broad societal movement toward
strengthening women’s rights.16 In 1964, eight years before the passage of
Title IX, Congress passed Title VII, which banned discrimination in the
workplace on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”17
Subsequently, women’s rights advocates turned their efforts toward eradicating
gender discrimination in education.18
The congressional debates barely mention the issue of gender discrimination
in athletics, and, as a result, the statutory language of Title IX does not
explicitly address this issue.19 Rather, the statute’s terms are quite broad,20
stating that “[n]o person in the United States shall on the basis of sex be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”21
Following the passage of Title IX, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) lobbied to restrict applying the statute to intercollegiate
athletics.22 However, the proposed legislation ran into opposition as it would
have exempted intercollegiate athletics from Title IX entirely.23 Subsequent
efforts sought to exempt intercollegiate athletic activities from Title IX
16. BRAKE, supra note 3, at 17.
17. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII § 703, 78 Stat.
241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 703 2000e-2 (2006)).
18. BRAKE, supra note 3, at 17.
19. Id. at 17–18. Nonetheless, data demonstrate a positive correlation between Title IX and
gender equity in intercollegiate athletics. For example, from 1971 to 1972, a mere 29,972 women
participated in NCAA varsity athletics, compared to 170,384 men. Title IX Athletic Statistics,
AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, http://www.aauw.org/act/laf/library/athleticStatistics.cfm (last
visited Sept. 9, 2011). However, by 2005, there was a 456 percent increase in female NCAA
varsity athletic participation, with 166,728 women participating. Id. During the same time
period, male participation in NCAA varsity athletics increased only 31 percent. Id. Nonetheless,
women’s rights advocates continue to argue rightly that women are still shortchanged with
respect to intercollegiate athletic opportunities. See id. (calculating that “[w]hile women made up
54% of all undergraduate students during the 2005–2006 school year, the female share of athletes
was only 45%” and that “[f]emale NCAA athletes receive only 45% of college athletic
scholarship dollars, which is $166 million less in scholarships than male college athletes”); see
also NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. & DLA PIPER, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE
TO TITLE IX AND ATHLETIC OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that “female participation in
intercollegiate sports remains below pre-Title IX male participation”).
20. See Kenneth L. Thomas & Ramadanah M. Salaam, The Face of Title IX: Post-Jackson
v. Birmingham Board of Education, 66 ALA. LAW. 429, 433 (2005) (quoting Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005)) (noting that, in Title IX cases, the Supreme
Court relies “on the ‘broad language’ of the statute to define discrimination”).
21. Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
22. BRAKE, supra note 3, at 18–19.
23. Id. Senator John Tower, a Republican from Texas, sponsored this legislation. Id.
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“insofar as such activit[ies] provide[d] to the institution gross receipts or
donations required by such institution to support that activity.”24
Corresponding legislation passed the Senate, but was ultimately replaced by a
compromise that instructed HEW to implement regulations enforcing Title
IX’s prohibition of sex discrimination through “reasonable provisions
considering the nature of particular sports.”25 This compromise became an
amendment to Title IX and provided the impetus for the development of
regulations addressing Title IX’s application to intercollegiate athletics.26
B. Title IX, the Spending Clause, and Principles of Contract Law
The Spending Clause provides the constitutional authority for Congress’s
enactment of Title IX.27 Legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause
is contractual in nature: to receive federal funding from Congress, state and
state-run entities agree to comply with certain imposed conditions.28 Thus, as
the Supreme Court noted in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, “the legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending
power . . . rests on whether the [recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts
the terms of the ‘contract.’”29 As a result, Congress may only impose
conditions—or contract terms—that are unambiguous.30 Pursuant to these
24. Amendment of Title IX of the Education S. 2106, 94th Cong. § 2 (1975). Senator
Tower also sponsored this legislation. See id.; BRAKE, supra note 3, at 18–19.
25. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006)); see BRAKE, supra note 3, at 19. Senator Jacob Javits, a
Republican from New York, offered the compromise provision. Id.
26. BRAKE, supra note 3, at 19–21; Education Amendments of 1974 § 844.
27. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998); U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”).
28. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2005) (quoting
Pennhurt’s discussion of the contractual nature of congressional legislation enacted under the
Spending Clause); Bd. of Educ. v. Rawley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982) (likening Spending
Clause legislation to a contract); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981).
29. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
30. Id.; see also Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296
(2006). The requirement that “Spending Clause legislation must be clear about the obligations it
is imposing . . . is . . . a rule of statutory construction [that] has become known as the ‘clear
statement’ rule.” Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear
Statement Rule for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2010). In addition
to the requirement that the imposed condition be unambiguous, the Supreme Court has
recognized several other “general restrictions” on legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending
Clause. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (discussing cases that articulate
these general restrictions). The first of these restrictions requires that “the exercise of the
spending power must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’” Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937) and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65
(1936)). Second, the conditions imposed should be related “‘to the federal interest in particular
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principles, courts closely examine situations in which Congress passes
legislation allowing courts to hold recipients liable in monetary damages for
failing to comply with the condition that is attached to the funding.31
C. Implementing Title IX: The HEW Regulations, the 1979 Policy
Interpretation, and the Administrative Enforcement Mechanism
Subsequent to the passage of the compromise legislation discussed in Part
I.A, HEW began the difficult task of promulgating regulations that apply Title
IX to intercollegiate athletics.32 HEW received thousands of written comments
during the drafting process.33 Ultimately, the final regulations provided:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another
person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient [of
federal funding], and no recipient shall provide any such athletics
separately on such basis.34
Much like the statutory language of Title IX, the implementing regulations
were quite broad and left a number of questions unanswered.35
Thus, more than three years after the regulations went into effect, HEW
issued a “Policy Interpretation” in which it sought, among other things, to
provide additional guidance to institutions of higher education with respect to
Title IX compliance in their intercollegiate athletic programs.36 This policy
interpretation set forth a three-part test to assess whether an institution is in
compliance with Title IX’s mandate to provide equal opportunities to
participate in intercollegiate athletics.37 First, if the institution demonstrates
that it offers opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics “in numbers
substantially proportionate” to the respective enrollments of male and female

national projects or programs.’” Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)). Further, “other constitutional provisions may provide an
independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing
Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269–70 (1985)); see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968).
31. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287 (1998) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 74–75 (1992), Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 596–603 (1983), and
Pennhurt, 451 U.S. at 28–29).
32. BRAKE, supra note 3, at 19–21.
33. Id. at 21.
34. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2011).
35. See generally BRAKE, supra note 3, at 21–23.
36. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 86
(2010)).
37. Id. at 71,418.
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students at the institution, it will be in compliance with Title IX.38 However,
even if the athletic opportunities offered are not substantially proportionate to
the respective enrollments of male and female students, the institution may still
be in compliance if it can satisfy one of the other two parts of the test.39
Second, the test states that the institution can establish compliance with Title
IX if it can “show a history and continuing practice of program expansion
which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the
members” of the underrepresented sex.40 Third, an institution is found
compliant if it can show “that the interests and abilities of the members of [the
underrepresented] sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the
Federal courts defer to this three-part test
present program.”41
38. Id. The plaintiff carries the burden to establish that the institution has not complied with
the first element of the three-part test. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colo. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829
n.5 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Because an institution is not required to maintain gender balance, it is fair
to conclude that proving an imbalance lies with the plaintiff.”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d
888, 901 (1st Cir. 1993); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584 (W.D. Pa. 1992). If
the plaintiff does not carry his or her burden, “the institution will be found in compliance.”
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CNTR. & DLA PIPER, supra note 19, at 35.
39. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CNTR. & DLA PIPER, supra note 19, at 35.
40. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, A Policy Interpretation: Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. To satisfy the second element, the
institution carries the burden of demonstrating both “a history and a continuing practice of
upgrading the competitive opportunities available to the historically disadvantaged sex as
warranted by developing abilities among the athletes of that sex.” Id. In assessing whether an
institution has “a history of program expansion that is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex,” the Office of Civil Rights, as well as courts,
will consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors:
[A]n institution’s record of adding intercollegiate teams, or upgrading teams to
intercollegiate status, for the underrepresented sex; [] an institution’s record of
increasing the numbers of participants in intercollegiate athletics who are members of
the underrepresented sex; and [] an institution’s affirmative responses to requests by
students or others for addition or elevation of sports.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP’T OF EDUC., CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST (1996) (emphasis omitted). Further, when reviewing
whether an institution has a continuing practice of such program expansion, the following nonexhaustive list of factors is considered:
[A]n institution’s current implementation of a nondiscriminatory policy or procedure
for requesting the addition of sports (including the elevation of club or intramural
teams) and the effective communication of the policy or procedure to students; and an
institution’s current implementation of a plan of program expansion that is responsive
to developing interests and abilities.
Id.
41. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, A Policy Interpretation: Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. It is unsettled which party carries the
burden of proving unmet interest and ability on the part of the underrepresented sex. See NAT’L
WOMEN’S LAW CNTR. & DLA PIPER, supra note 19, at 41 (advising plaintiffs to be prepared to
carry the burden of persuasion on the third element of the test). According to the Department of
Education, an institution is considered in compliance with the third element unless “there is (a)
unmet interest in a particular sport; (b) sufficient ability to sustain a team in the sport; and (c) a

1214

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:1207

when addressing compliance with Title IX by educational institutions.42
Federal agencies are expressly tasked with enforcing the anti-discrimination
mandate of Title IX.43 However, a federal agency may not commence
enforcement actions until it has “advised the appropriate person or persons of
the failure to comply with” Title IX and “determined that compliance cannot
be secured by voluntary means.”44

reasonable expectation of competition for the team.” OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS: THE THREEPART TEST, supra note 40 (1996). In assessing whether sufficient interest exists among the
underrepresented sex to sustain an intercollegiate team, the Department of Education and the
courts consider the following:
requests from students . . . that a particular sport be added; [] requests that an existing
club sport be elevated to intercollegiate team status; [] participation in particular club or
intramural sports; [] interviews with students, . . . coaches, administrators and others
regarding interest in particular sports; [] results of questionnaires of students . . .
regarding interests in particular sports; and [] participation in particular in
interscholastic sports by admitted students.
Id. Further, in assessing whether interested students of the underrepresented sex can sustain an
intercollegiate team, courts will consider factors like the requisite athletic experience of the
interested students, the opinions of coaches and others in the field about whether the interested
students have “the potential to sustain a varsity team,” and the past competitive experiences of the
interested students. Id. Even if sufficient interest and ability are established, there still must be
“a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for [the] particular sport in the
institution’s normal competitive region.” Id.
42. See, e.g., McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 290 (2d Cir. 2004)
(noting the parties’ agreement that the court “should defer to the Policy Interpretation”); Chalenor
v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that “controlling deference is due”
to the Policy Interpretation); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 173 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding
“that the district court did not err in the degree of deference it accorded” to the Policy
Interpretation); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 272–75 (6th Cir. 1994)
(utilizing the Policy Interpretation to analyze plaintiffs’ Title IX claim alleging gender
discrimination); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991)) (establishing that the
court must defer to the Policy Interpretation because it meets the reasonableness standard);
Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir.1993)) (articulating that the Policy Interpretation is entitled to
“‘appreciable deference’”).
43. Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2006) (“Each
Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any
education program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section
1681 of this Title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders
of general applicability . . . .”). The President must approve any rule, regulation, or order adopted
pursuant to this statute. Id. The statute provides that federal departments and agencies can
enforce the rules, regulations, and orders they adopt by terminating or refusing to grant or
continue federal assistance to any federal monies recipient “as to whom there has been an express
finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such
requirement.” Id. The statute also gives federal agencies the freedom to utilize any other means
authorized by law to enforce their rules. Id.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2006).
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D. The Judicial Creation of Title IX’s Private Cause of Action and Right to
Monetary Damages
Title IX is silent with respect to whether a private right of action exists under
the statute.45 However, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme
Court held that the language, history, and underlying purpose of Title IX
implicitly supported a finding that the statute creates a private right of action to
enforce its anti-discrimination mandate.46 Subsequently, in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme Court held that monetary
damages are an available remedy for a private action to enforce Title IX.47 In
order to bring a successful claim, a Title IX litigant must establish that: (1)
45. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 683 (1979) (“The statute does
not . . . expressly authorize a private right of action by a person injured by a violation of [Title
IX].”).
46. Id. at 709. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied heavily on what it construed
as congressional acquiescence to the Fifth Circuit’s creation of a private right of action under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 694–96 (citing Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon,
370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967)). The Cannon majority reasoned that Title IX was “patterned
after” Title VI because both statutes use identical language, have “the same administrative
mechanisms for terminating federal financial support for institutions engaged in prohibited
discrimination,” and neither statute contains a private right of action. Id. at 694–96. The Court
also asserted that the congressional debates indicated that the drafters of Title IX assumed that the
legislation would be interpreted and applied in the same manner as Title VI. Id. at 696 (citing
117 CONG. REC. 30408 (1972) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); 118 CONG. REC. 5807, 18437
(1971) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). Thus, the Court “presum[ed] [] that [Congress] w[as]
aware of the prior interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflect[ed] [Congressional]
intent with respect to Title IX.” Id. at 697–98. Justice White, in a dissent joined by Justice
Blackmun, argued that “the legislative history and statutory scheme [of Title IX] show[ed] that
Congress intended not to provide a new private cause of action.” Id. at 718 (White, J.,
dissenting). In a separate dissent, Justice Powell contended that separation of powers principles
counseled against the judicial creation of a private right of action under Title IX. Id. at 730–49
(Powell, J., dissenting).
47. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (“[W]e conclude that a damages remedy is available for an
action brought to enforce Title IX.”). In reaching this determination, the Court noted “[t]he
general rule . . . that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the
power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a
federal statute.” Id. at 70–71. Thus, the question before the Franklin Court was whether
Congress had intended to limit the power of the federal courts to award appropriate relief under
Title IX. Id. at 71. In order to facilitate its determination, the Court referred to two congressional
amendments to Title IX enacted subsequent to its decision in Cannon: the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986 and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. Id. at 72. The Rehabilitation
Acts Amendment eliminated sovereign immunity as a bar to Title IX suits, and the Civil Rights
Restoration Act “broaden[ed] the coverage of [Title IX’s] antidiscrimination provisions.” Id. at
72–73. The Court determined that no evidence, including these amendments, demonstrated that
Congress intended to limit Title IX claimants’ remedies. Id. at 73. Therefore, the Court
concluded that Congress had acquiesced to the Court’s decision in Cannon, thereby permitting
monetary damages in private Title IX suits. Id.; see also id. at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“Because of legislation enacted subsequent to Cannon, it is too late in the day to
address whether a judicially implied exclusion of damages under Title IX would be
appropriate.”).
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gender discrimination occurred; (2) in an educational activity or program; (3)
offered by an institution that receives federal funding.48 As discussed below,
the Supreme Court, in Gebser, added a fourth element—a notice requirement.49
II. GEBSER AND THE SUBSEQUENT CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE APPLICABILITY OF
GEBSER TO TITLE IX ATHLETICS SUITS
A. The Imposition of a Notice Requirement: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District
1. The District Court and the Fifth Circuit: Laying the Groundwork for the
Imposition of a Notice Requirement by the Supreme Court
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, an eighth-grade
student, Alida Star Gebser, was involved in a sexual relationship with Frank
Waldrop, a teacher in the Lago Vista Independent School District.50 Unrelated
to Waldrop’s sexual relationship with Gebser, Waldrop gained a reputation
among the students of making sexually inappropriate comments, prompting
parents to complain to the high school’s principal.51 When the principal met
with Waldrop, Waldrop indicated that he did not believe that he had made
sexually offensive statements, but agreed to apologize to the parents
nonetheless.52 The principal warned Waldrop “to be careful about his
classroom comments” and informed the school’s guidance counselor about the
meeting.53 However, the principal did not report the complaint to the school
district’s Title IX coordinator.54
Subsequently, a police officer caught Waldrop and Gebser “engaging in
sexual intercourse.”55 After Waldrop was arrested, the school district fired
him, and the State of Texas revoked his teaching license.56 At the time of
Waldrop’s arrest and subsequent termination, the school district had not
established a formal procedure for accepting sexual harassment complaints,
nor had it issued an official anti-harassment policy.57
48. Heckman, supra note 6, at 553–54 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000)).
49. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); see also Diane
Heckman, Symposium, Is Notice Required in a Title IX Athletics Action Not Involving Sexual
Harassment?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175, 177 (2003).
50. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277–78. See Andrew Speranzini, Case Comment, Paying for
Sex—When Is a School District Liable for Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment Under Title IX?,
51 FLA. L. REV. 589, 589–98 (1999) (providing a concise but thorough summary of the Gebser
case).
51. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
52. Id. at 278.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Gebser and her mother filed suit against the school district under Title IX in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.58 The
district court and the parties agreed that Title IX provides “a private cause of
action”59 in this context, but disagreed over the standard with which to evaluate
the school district’s liability for the acts of its employee.60 Gebser argued that
the school district should be held strictly liable for Waldrop’s discrimination.61
Conversely, Lago Vista Independent School District contended that absent
“some knowledge or reason to know of the discrimination[,]” a school district
is not liable under Title IX.62 The district court ultimately agreed with the
school district, reasoning that imposing liability without a finding of adequate
notice of the discrimination and an opportunity to cure does not serve Title
IX’s purpose to “counter policies of discrimination . . . in federally funded
education programs.”63 The district court found that the school district
received complaints only related to Waldrop’s sexually offensive comments.64
The court held that these complaints alone were not sufficient to put the school
district on either “actual or constructive notice of Waldrop’s sexually
discriminatory conduct” and consequently granted the school district’s motion
for summary judgment.65
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.66 On appeal, the
plaintiffs argued that the court should apply agency law and hold the school
district vicariously liable for Waldrop’s tortious conduct.67 The Fifth Circuit

58. Doe v. Waldrop, No. A 95 CA 126 126 SS, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21946, at *1–2
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1995), aff’d, Doe v. Lago Vista Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir.
1997), aff’d Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 293 (1998). Gebser and her
mother also alleged that the school district had negligently supervised Waldrop and that the
school district had violated Gebser’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Id. The district
court granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment on all three claims, but the
plaintiff appealed only the Title IX claim. See Doe, 106 F.3d at 1225.
59. Waldrop, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21946, at *6–7.
60. Id. at *7 (noting that this question is the “pivotal issue of disagreement”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *8–9 (emphasis in original) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704
n.36 (1979)) (noting that “impos[ing] . . . strict liability on school districts” does not further Title
IX’s goals).
64. Id. at *13.
65. Id. at *14.
66. Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997), aff’d, Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 293 (1998).
67. Doe, 106 F.3d at 1225 (noting that the theory of strict liability was no longer available
to the plaintiff because the Fifth Circuit had recently rejected strict liability under Title IX in
Canutillo Independent. School District v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996), and that the theory
of constructive evidence was not helpful to the plaintiffs because there was not enough evidence
to argue that the school district should have known about the abuse).
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rejected this argument,68 holding that it would be improper to permit plaintiffs
to use Title IX, a Spending Clause statute, to bring tort actions merely because
a teacher’s employment status had facilitated sexual harassment.”69 On
December 5, 1997, the Supreme Court granted Gebser’s petition for
certiorari.70
2. The Supreme Court Affirms the Lower Courts
In a five-four decision,71 the Court held that damages are not available
“unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged
discrimination . . . has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s
programs and fails adequately to respond.”72 The Court rejected Gebser’s
argument that the standard for teacher-student sexual harassment should be
similar to the standard applied in Title VII supervisor-employee sexual
harassment cases,73 pointing out that, “[u]nlike Title IX, Title VII contains an
68. Id. at 1226 (citing Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir.
1997) (rejecting an agency theory of liability under Title IX by requiring actual knowledge by the
school district).
69. Id.
70. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 522 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1997).
71. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authored the majority opinion in Gebser, joined by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist as well as Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence
Thomas. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 274 (1998). Justice John Paul
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen Breyer. Id. Justice Ginsburg also filed a separate dissenting opinion, which Justices
Souter and Breyer joined. Id. During her tenure on the Court, Justice O’Connor wrote many of
the majority opinions in Title IX cases. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
632 (1999); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005). In Davis, the Court
recognized student-on-student sexual harassment as a potential basis for a Title IX private action.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. As discussed infra note 88, the Court in Jackson held that Title IX’s
private right of action encompasses claims for retaliatory conduct. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171,
181–84. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia dissented in both
Davis and Jackson. The voting dynamics in these three cases are interesting. In Gebser, which
was decided first, Justice O’Connor sided with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Scalia in a holding that restricts the ability of litigants under Title IX to recover
damages. But, true to her reputation as a “swing vote,” in her plaintiff-friendly opinions in
Jackson and Davis, Justice O’Connor voted with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer—the dissenters in Gebser. See Tom Curry, O’Connor Had Immense Power as Swing
Vote, MSNBC (July 1, 2005, 10:33:14 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5304484/ns/us_
news-the_changing_court/t/oconnor-had-immense-power-swing-vote/#.TrcsG82bFwc.
72. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
73. Id. at 281–82. It is not surprising that Gebser made this argument, given the fact that the
statutory language and structure of Title IX borrows extensively from Title VII. See Earl C.
Dudley, Jr. & George Ruthergien, Ironies, Inconsistencies, and Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX,
Title VII, and Statistical Evidence of Discrimination, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 177, 192–94 (1999)
(noting that Title IX is framed “[l]ike other civil rights statutes” and that one of Title IX’s
provisions “is taken directly from the corresponding provision in Title VII . . . . ”). Although
beyond the scope of this Note, the question of whether Title VII standards and jurisprudence
should be applied to Title IX claims has generated some legal scholarship. See, e.g., Michael E.
Buchwald, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Education and Student Athletics: A Case for Why
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express cause of action . . . and specifically provides for relief in the form of
monetary damages.”74 Noting that Title IX’s private right of action was
judicially created, the Court stressed that Congress had not addressed the scope
of this private right of action or when monetary damages should be awarded.75
In order to craft a remedial scheme, the Court attempted to infer how
Congress would have addressed the issue by looking to Title VII, another civil
rights statute.76 The majority noted that when Title IX was enacted, Title VII
contained an express right of action, but did not provide for monetary damages
and permitted only injunctive and equitable relief.77 Further, Congress did not
expressly authorize monetary damages under Title VII until 1991 and
specifically limited the amount recoverable in different actions.78 Thus, the
Court reasoned that adopting Gebser’s position would allow unlimited
recovery in a private Title IX action even though Congress had previously
rejected such an expansive scope of damages under Title VII.79 The Court
further distinguished Title IX and Title VII by comparing the different
purposes of the two statutes: Title VII seeks to “compensate victims of
discrimination,” while Title IX focuses on “‘protecting’ individuals from
discriminatory practices” by entities receiving federal funds.80
The Court also noted that Title IX operates under a “contractual framework”
whereby only educational institutions that receive federal funding are subject
to its prohibitions.81 The Court observed that when Congress attaches certain
Title IX Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence Should Develop Independently of Title VII, 67 MD. L.
REV. 672, 675 (2008) (arguing that “Title IX jurisprudence should develop independently of Title
VII”).
74. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority opinion
amounted to an “assertion of lawmaking authority [that was] not faithful either to our precedents
or to [the Court’s] duty to interpret, rather than to revise, congressional commands” and that “the
majority’s policy judgment about the appropriate remedy . . . thwarts the purposes of Title IX.”
Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the school district should be held
liable for Waldrop’s tort. Id. at 299 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)
(1997)) (concluding that Waldrop was “‘aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation’”).
75. Id. at 284 (majority opinion) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)).
76. Id. at 285–86 (noting that crafting a sensible remedial scheme is an “endeavor [that]
inherently entails a degree of speculation, since it addresses an issue on which Congress has not
specifically spoken”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 286 (noting that Congress “carefully limited the amount recoverable in any
individual case”).
79. Id. The dissent rejected the majority’s comparative analysis of Title VII and Title IX,
arguing that the congressionally imposed ceiling on the amount of damages that can be recovered
in Title VII cases “does not have any bearing on when damages may be recovered from a
defendant in a Title IX case.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 287 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 286–87. The “contractual nature” of Title IX had important ramifications for the
Court’s analysis regarding the scope of remedies available under the private right of action. Id. at
287; see also Emily R. Rankin, Case Note, School Law – School District Liability Under Title IX:
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conditions to receipt of federal funding pursuant to the Spending Clause, courts
must carefully consider the appropriateness of monetary damages for failing to
comply with that condition.82 With this in mind, the Gebser Court expressed
“concerns” about permitting “a school district’s liability for a teacher’s sexual
harassment [to] rest[] on principles of constructive notice or respondeat
superior” because the school district may have been unaware of the
discrimination.83 Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was “sensible to
assume that Congress did not envision a recipient’s liability in damages” where
the recipient was unaware of the alleged Title IX violation.84
The most important factor to the Court, however, was the nature of Title
IX’s express administrative enforcement mechanism.85 A federal agency may
not commence enforcement actions under Title IX until the agency “has
advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with” Title
IX and “determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.”86
Thus, the Court observed, Title IX’s “express system of
enforcement . . . require[s] notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come
into voluntary compliance.”87 It would therefore “be unsound,” the Court
reasoned, to establish a precedent whereby courts could hold a recipient of
federal funding liable for violating Title IX without notice or an opportunity to
cure.88
Actual Notice Is the Requisite Standard for Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment, 34 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 495, 505 (1999) (“The Court asserted that Title IX’s contractual nature ha[d]
implications for the Court’s construction of available remedies.”).
82. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,
74–75 (1992)) (“Our central concern in that regard is with ensuring ‘that the receiving entity of
federal funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.’”).
83. Id. at 287.
84. Id. at 287–88.
85. Id. at 288; see supra Part I.C (discussing Title IX’s administrative enforcement
mechanisms).
86. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288.
87. Id. at 289.
88. Id.
The dissent characterized the majority’s reliance on Title IX’s express
administrative enforcement mechanism as “inappropriate,” stating that “[t]he fact that Congress
has specified a particular administrative procedure to be followed when a subsidy is to be
terminated . . . does not illuminate the question of what [a] victim of discrimination on the basis
of sex must prove in order to recover damages.” Id. at 303–04 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissent argued that the majority opinion establishes an “exceedingly high standard” for Title IX
plaintiffs, and “virtually ‘render[s] inutile causes of action authorized by Congress through a
decision that no remedy is available.’” Id. at 304 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs.,
503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992)). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a short dissenting opinion, focusing
on the question left open by Justice Stevens’s dissent: “whether a [school] district should be
relieved from damages liability if it has in place, and effectively publicizes and enforces, a policy
to curtail and redress injuries caused by sexual harassment.” Id. at 306 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
see also Kelly Titus, Note, Students, Beware: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,
60 LA. L. REV. 321, 344–45 (1999) (arguing that the Gebser Court should have adopted Justice
Ginsburg’s approach). Two additional Supreme Court cases decided subsequent to Gebser are
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B. The Circuit Split Over the Applicability of Gebser to Title IX Athletics Suits
1. The Eight Circuit Applies Gebser
In Grandson v. University of Minnesota, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a
Title IX violation had not occurred because the plaintiffs failed to comply with
Gebser’s requirements.89 The plaintiffs in Grandson brought two Title IX
actions against the University of Minnesota, alleging that the University’s
Duluth campus had discriminated against female student athletes.90 The
district court struck down the plaintiffs’ Title IX monetary damages claims
because the plaintiffs had not satisfied the standards set forth in Gebser.91 The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court, observing that, although the
plaintiffs’ first claim contained a lengthy recitation of the University’s
“disparities in the resources and opportunities afforded [to] the women’s and
men’s athletic programs[,]” the complaint failed under Gebser because it
also worthy of mention. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the petitioner brought a
Title IX action on behalf of her fifth-grade daughter, who was allegedly the victim of student-onstudent sexual harassment, of which the school board was aware. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). In another five-four decision, the Court held that such an action
could lie under Title IX, “but only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to
known acts of harassment in its programs or activities.” Id. In its holding, the Court implicitly
recognized that in Title IX suits alleging student-on-student sexual harassment a plaintiff must
satisfy Gebser’s notice and opportunity to cure requirement in order to recover damages. See
Davis, 526 U.S. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority opinion in Davis
“appears to adopt the Gebser notice standard by implication”); Heckman, supra note 49, at 177.
The dissent in Davis argued that potential defendants under Title IX must “receive clear notice of
the conditions attached to the federal funds.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The dissent observed that “Title IX does not by its terms create any private cause of action
whatsoever, much less define the circumstances in which money damages are available.” Id. at
656. In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Supreme Court addressed the
applicability of the Gebser notice requirement to Title IX claim based on retaliation. Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005). In Jackson, the plaintiff, a basketball coach
at Ensley High School, was removed from his position as coach after he complained to his
supervisors that the girls basketball team was being discriminated against on the basis of gender.
Id. at 171–72. Jackson filed a suit under Title IX alleging that the Board had retaliated against
him because of his complaints. Id. at 171. In yet another five-four decision, the Court held that
Title IX contains a private right of action to bring a retaliation claim. Id. at 171. The Court
further reasoned that the Gebser notice requirement should not apply to Title IX retaliation suits
because applying this requirement in the retaliation context would enable “recipients . . . to avoid
such notice by retaliating against all those who dare complain,” thereby “subvert[ing]” Title IX’s
statutory enforcement mechanism. Id. at 181–84. The dissent contended that the majority’s
finding of a right of action for retaliatory conduct under Title IX was “contrary to the plain terms
of Title IX, because retaliatory conduct is not discrimination on the basis of sex.” Id. at 185
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress must speak with a clear voice when it imposes liability on the
States through its spending power.”).
89. 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001).
90. Id. at 570–71. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and monetary relief. Id. at 570.
91. Id. at 573 (noting that the court also denied plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief for lack
of standing because they did not play a varsity sport and had not exhausted their NCAA
remedies).
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lacked the other components of a successful allegation, including prior notice,
deliberate indifference by the University, and an opportunity to rectify the
alleged discrimination.92 As a result, the Eighth Circuit held that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their
complaint.93
With regard to the second action, the plaintiff argued that Gebser’s notice
requirement was satisfied because the University had already received
numerous complaints “about the level of funding for women’s athletics and the
lack of women’s varsity teams.”94 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that
“[a] vigorous public debate on these issues d[id] not demonstrate that [the
University] knew of systemic non-compliance.”95 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the district court properly dismissed the second action because
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she provided the requisite notice to a
proper university official.96
2. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits Distinguish Gebser
In Pederson v. Louisiana State University, the Fifth Circuit considered eight
consolidated appeals alleging that Louisiana State University (LSU)
“discriminated against women under Title IX in the provision of facilities and
teams for intercollegiate athletic competition.”97 LSU relied on Gebser and
argued that in order to find intentional discrimination, a showing that LSU was
aware that it was not effectively accommodating its female student-athletes
was required.98
The Fifth Circuit rejected application of the Gebser notice requirement in the
Title IX athletic-opportunity context.99 The court reasoned that the issue in
Gebser was whether a school district should be held vicariously liable for the
discriminatory conduct of one of its teachers.100 In the case before it, the Fifth
Circuit held that it was not an employee that was discriminating but “the
institution itself.”101 As a result, whether LSU had notice of the discrimination
was irrelevant; rather, the appropriate test was whether LSU had intended to
discriminate against women based on their sex through the provision of
unequal athletic opportunities.102 The court found intentional discrimination in
92. Id. at 575.
93. Id. (noting that the plaintiffs had alleged in a “cursory fashion” that the University
“intentionally violated Title IX by knowingly and deliberately discriminating”).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 576.
97. 213 F.3d 858, 864 (5th Cir. 2000).
98. Id. at 882.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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LSU’s violation of Title IX because LSU’s failure to provide equal athletic
opportunities was the result of “paternalism” and “stereotypical assumptions”
with respect to the abilities and interests of its female students.103 The Ninth
Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Mansourian v. Regents of the
University of California.104 In Mansourian, three female wrestlers enrolled at
the University of California, Davis (UCD) so that they could participate in
UCD’s wrestling program, which permitted female participation.105 At the
time of their enrollment, UCD’s wrestling program only permitted women
wrestlers to compete against other women, using “international freestyle
rules.”106 Subsequently, UCD eliminated the women’s wrestling program, but,
after many complaints, agreed to allow female participation, conditioned on
the women’s ability to “beat male wrestlers in their weight class, using men’s
collegiate wrestling rules.”107 The new rules impeded female participation,
resulting in the women losing their varsity status, scholarships, and other
benefits associated with varsity status.108 The female students filed a lawsuit
under Title IX.109 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
UCD, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the Gebser
pre-litigation notice and opportunity to cure requirement.110
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that Gebser is not applicable in cases
that involve discrimination based on an official policy of the federal funding
recipient.111 The Ninth Circuit found that “[a]thletic programs that fail
effectively to accommodate students of both sexes [] represent ‘official policy
of the recipient entity.’”112 Therefore, the court held that Gebser did not
apply.113
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Gebser’s requirements were redundant
in the context of Title IX lawsuits alleging unequal athletic opportunities
because universities track athletic gender-equity data and certify Title IX

103. Id. at 880.
104. 602 F.3d 957, 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
105. Id. at 961.
106. Id. at 962 (noting that the University did not have a separate wrestling team for women,
but allowed women to participate on the men’s team).
107. Id.
108. Id. These benefits include: “training, coaching, and laundry services; academic tutoring;
insurance; and access to varsity facilities and equipment.” Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 966.
111. Id. at 967 (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998))
(noting that Gebser is only applicable “when the alleged Title IX violation consists of an
institution’s deliberate indifference to acts that ‘do not involve official policy of the recipient
entity.’”).
112. Id. at 968 (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290). For the author’s criticism of this
argument, see infra Part III.A.
113. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968.
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compliance.114 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Equity in Athletics
Disclosure Act (EADA)115 requires federally funded universities to report “the
number of undergraduates and athletes, broken down by sex, as well as
sex-segregated data on operating expenses, coaches salaries, athletic
scholarships, recruiting expenditures, and revenues.”116 In light of these
requirements, the court reasoned that applying the Gebser notice requirement
would not provide universities with information of which they were not
already aware.117
III. LAW AND POLICY SUPPORT APPLICATION OF GEBSER TO TITLE IX
ATHLETICS SUITS
The Fifth Circuit in Pederson and the Ninth Circuit118 in Mansourian missed
a valuable opportunity to further Congress’s goal in enacting Title IX. Instead,

114. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.4) (discussing federal regulations that “require funding
recipients to evaluate their policies and certify, as a condition for receiving funds, that they are
‘tak[ing] whatever remedial action is necessary . . . to eliminate . . . discrimination.’”).
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that universities have an “affirmative obligation to
ensure compliance with at least one prong of the three-part . . . test.” Id.; see supra notes 36–42
and accompanying text (discussing the three-part test).
115. Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2006).
116. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968.
117. Id. (noting that this was a case of first impression for the Ninth Circuit). The Ninth
Circuit cited approvingly the Fifth Circuit’s decision in the Pederson case. Id. (citing Pederson v.
La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 882 (5th Cir. 2000)). The court, however, voiced strong
disagreement with the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Grandson, noting that “[t]he Eighth
Circuit . . . has assumed, without any analysis, that Gebser’s notice requirement applies equally to
Title IX cases where plaintiffs allege discrimination in the administration of an athletic program.”
Id. at 968–69 (citing Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth
Circuit further contended that “it is far from clear that Grandson is controlling even in the Eighth
Circuit” because “the Eighth Circuit reached the merits of a later Title IX athletics case without
mentioning Grandson.” Id. at 969 (citing Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir.
2002)). This claim with respect to Grandson is a bit of a reach. Unlike Grandson, there is no
express indication that the district court in Chalenor considered the applicability of Gebser to the
plaintiffs’ Title IX claims or that the University pressed such an argument before the district
court. See Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D.N.D. 2000). Because an issue can
only be reviewed on appeal if it has been “pressed or passed upon” by the district court, United
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 40 (1992), it is likely that the Eighth Circuit in Chalenor did not
address Grandson for jurisdictional reasons, and not because it lacked precedential value.
118. Public figures critical of the Ninth Circuit have labeled it as an “activist court,” with
mocking terms such as the “Ninth Circus” and the “nutty Ninth.” John Schwartz, ‘Liberal’
Reputation Precedes Ninth Circuit Court, N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 2010 at A33. Whether the
decision from the Ninth Circuit merits these nicknames is debatable; however, the Ninth Circuits’
most vocal critics can point to at least one fact to support their assessment: from 1999 to 2008, the
Ninth Circuit was second only to the Federal Circuit with respect to the percentage of cases
reversed (80 percent) relative to cases reviewed by the Supreme Court. Roy E. Hofer, Supreme
Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, LANDSLIDE (Jan./Feb. 2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_H
ofer.authcheckdam.pdf. Consistent with this documented trend, the reasoning by the Ninth
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the circuits misapplied Gebser and disregarded previous jurisprudence on the
Spending Clause.
A. The Misapplication of Gebser
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gebser deserves attention. However,
neither the Fifth Circuit in Pederson nor the Ninth Circuit in Mansourian
adequately discussed the Supreme Court’s reasoning.119 As the Court noted in
Gebser, the private right of action under Title IX is judicially—not
congressionally—created.120 Accordingly, there is no clear expression of
congressional intent with respect to the scope of the Title IX private right of
action.121 Applying the Gebser notice and opportunity to cure requirements to
Title IX athletics lawsuits would mitigate the effects of the legislating-fromthe-bench approach the Supreme Court undertook in Cannon when it created
Title IX’s private right of action.122
Circuit in Mansourian has strong potential to open the Ninth Circuit to further criticism, and
potential reversal..
119. Compare Pederson, 213 F.3d 858, and Mansourian, 602 F.3d 957, with Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
120. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283–84.
See Kristen Safier, Comment, A Request for
Congressional Action: Deconstructing the Supreme Court’s (In)Activism in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1316–19 (2000) (discussing the
majority and dissenting opinions in Gebser).
121. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. See Sara A. Peckham, Casenotes, Title IX Standards in
Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment: What Are We Teaching the Teachers? – Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1805, 1812–14 (1999) (discussing the
Gebser majority’s analysis of the scope of Title IX’s private right of action).
122. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 292–93. This is not to say that a Title IX private right of
action should not exist. Clearly, the Supreme Court’s holding in Cannon is the law and should be
regarded as such. Nonetheless, Justice Powell criticized the Cannon majority’s finding of an
implied private right of action as essentially amounting to legislating from the bench:
In sum, I believe the need both to restrain courts that too readily have created private
causes of action, and to encourage Congress to confront its obligation to resolve crucial
policy questions created by the legislation it enacts, has become compelling . . . . [W]e
should not condone the implication of any private action from a federal statute absent
the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist.
Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alternative mechanism for
enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be especially reluctant ever to permit a
federal court to volunteer its services for enforcement purposes.
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Craig Nadeau, Comment: Respecting
Congress’s Express Intent: Correcting the Split Allowing Unions an Implied Private Right of
Action Under LMRDA Section 501, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 821, 829–30 (2010) (discussing Justice
Powell’s dissent in Cannon). Applying the Gebser pre-litigation notice and opportunity to cure
requirement to Title IX suits can be viewed as a compromise. Since a reasonable argument can
be made that the Supreme Court created the Title IX private right of action “absent the most
compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist,” plaintiffs should at
least be required to satisfy the Gebser standard before bringing a Title IX athletics suit pursuant
to that judicially created right of action. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, as the Court noted in Gebser, the sole enforcement proceeding
expressly included in Title IX and its implementing regulations cannot be
initiated without first giving “notice to the recipient and an opportunity to
come into voluntary compliance.”123 This fact led the Gebser Court to
conclude that, compared to the express enforcement mechanism, “it would be
unsound” to hold that “a judicially implied system of enforcement permits
substantial liability without regard to the recipient’s knowledge or its
corrective actions upon receiving notice.”124 The Ninth and Fifth Circuits
failed to explain why this powerful analysis would not apply equally to Title
IX athletics lawsuits.125 By holding that pre-litigation notice and opportunity
to cure are not required in Title IX athletic lawsuits, Mansourian and Pederson
are inconsistent with the express Title IX enforcement mechanism.126
B. The Importance of the Spending Clause
Mansourian and Pederson do not acknowledge that Congress enacted Title
IX pursuant to its Spending Clause power.127 This is an important omission
because, as the Supreme Court stated in Gebser, private actions for damages
under statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause are “examine[d]
closely.”128 Furthermore, the contractual nature of legislation enacted pursuant
to the Spending Clause supports the conclusion that Gebser should apply to

123. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288–89; see also Anne-Marie Harris & Kenneth B. Grooms, A New
Lesson Plan for Educational Institutions: Expanded Rules Governing Liability Under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 for Student and Faculty Sexual Harassment, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POLICY & L. 575, 584 (2000) (discussing Title IX’s “complex administrative
enforcement scheme”).
124. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288–89; see also Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment—
Interference with an Equal Educational Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79
NEB. L. REV. 1, 31 (2000) (noting that the Gebser Court “looked to the express administrative
remedy found in Title IX, requiring notice to an appropriate person and an opportunity to rectify
any violation, for guidance in fashioning the implied damage remedy”).
125. See generally Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 966–69 (9th
Cir. 2010) (holding that no notice is required in athletics suits under Title IX); Pederson v. La.
State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 876–82 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing Title IX).
126. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288 (noting that Title IX’s express enforcement mechanism
requires notice); supra Part I.C (discussing Title IX’s enforcement mechanism); see also Janet
Philibosian, Comment, Homework Assignment: The Proper Interpretation of the Standard for
Institutional Liability if We Are to Protect Students in Cases of Sexual Harassment by Teachers,
33 SW. U. L. REV. 95, 107 (2003) (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288) (describing how the Gebser
Court found Title IX’s express means of enforcement to be an “‘important clue’ that Congress did
not intend to allow recovery in damages based solely on legal principles of respondeat superior or
constructive notice”).
127. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287; see also supra Part I.B (discussing the Spending Clause
and its application to Title IX).
128. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287; see also Philibosian, supra note 126, at 107 (noting that the
Gebser Court was concerned with holding grantees liable for unintentional violations of a
condition under the Spending Clause without first providing them notice of the violation).
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Title IX athletics lawsuits.129 First, logically, it would be quite a leap to argue
that any university that receives federal funds “voluntarily and knowingly
accepts” a risk that it could be sued for unequal provision of intercollegiate
athletic opportunities without any knowledge that such discrimination was
occurring.130 Moreover, Congress has not “unambiguously”131 set forth such a
risk in Title IX, since the statute is silent on the existence of a private right of
action.132
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Unsupported Assertions Regarding Intercollegiate
Athletics
In addition to misapplying Gebser, the Ninth Circuit in Mansourian made
broad assumptions regarding the role that universities play in their
intercollegiate sports. For example, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Gebser
was inapplicable because gender discrimination in athletic opportunities at the
intercollegiate level will always be caused by an “official policy of the
recipient entity.”133 The Ninth Circuit did not cite any legal, statistical, or
anecdotal evidence for this broad assertion.134 Furthermore, this reasoning is
problematic as evidence from reported cases indicates situations in which
individual actors have made decisions regarding allocation of funding between
men’s and women’s teams135 or the number of roster slots that would be
available for male and female athletes.136 The Ninth Circuit’s broad language,
however, forecloses the possibility that the discrimination could occur without
being the “official policy” of the university.137
The Ninth Circuit’s argument that a notice requirement would be
“superfluous” because of Title IX’s compliance certification requirements and
gender equity data requirements138 is similarly problematic. In reaching its
129. See supra note 122 for a discussion regarding why applying Gebser is arguably a
compromise to those who do not believe that Title IX should contain a private right of action.
130. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
131. Id.
132. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283–84 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 716–17
(1979)).
133. Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 968 (quoting Gebser, 524
U.S. at 290).
134. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968.
135. See, e.g., Choike v. Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa. of the State Sys. of Higher Educ., No.
06-622, 2006 WL 2060576, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2006) (noting that one university employee,
the Athletic Director, was “responsible for managing the Athletic Department’s . . . budget,
fund-raising and revenue efforts”).
136. See, e.g., Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 65 (D. Conn. 2010) (noting
that only two university employes oversaw the “roster target system”); Choike, 2006 WL
2060576, at *1 (noting that the Athletic Director was “responsible for . . . oversee[ing]
compliance with Title IX”).
137. See discussion at supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
138. See Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968.
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holding, the court does not address the possibility that the university employee
responsible for certifying compliance with Title IX or reporting related data
may not have the “authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures on the [university’s] behalf.”139 Thus, the Court’s
implicit holding that Title IX and the EADA reporting requirements obviate
the need for a pre-litigation notice requirement140 fails to address the
“opportunity to cure” prong of Gebser.141
D. Expanding the Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning:142 Sound Policy Counsels in
Favor of Applying Gebser to Title IX Athletics Lawsuits
As Gebser discusses, and the absence of an express private right to monetary
damages in Title IX indicates, Congress’s goal when enacting Title IX was not
to provide a monetary damages remedy to individuals who have been
discriminated against in violation of Title IX.143 Rather, Title IX seeks to
protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sex in the first place.144
Applying Gebser’s requirements in athletics lawsuits would facilitate this goal
by letting institutions dictate how to bring themselves into compliance with
Title IX, rather than forcing them to expend resources on litigation.145 In fact,
failing to apply Gebser to Title IX athletics lawsuits could undermine the
statute’s primary purpose. If courts do not require plaintiffs to satisfy Gebser
before pursuing a Title IX suit, university resources, which are already limited,
will be funneled away from university programs aimed at promoting gender
equity and channelled toward defending an endless number of lawsuits.146
139. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
140. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968.
141. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 288–90.
142. As noted supra note 117, the Ninth Circuit criticized the Eighth Circuit for reaching its
holding by “assum[ing], without analysis” that Gebser applies to Title IX athletics cases. See
Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968–69 (citing Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 F.3d 568, 275 (8th Cir.
2001)). The Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Grandson is
accurate; the Eighth Circuit opinion, although correct in its holding, is void of adequate analysis.
Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968–69 (citing Grandson, 272 F.3d at 575–76).
143. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
144. Id.; see also Anita M. Moorman & Lisa P. Masteralexis, An Examination of the Legal
Framework Between Title VII and Title IX Sexual Harassment Claims in Athletics and Sport
Settings: Emerging Challenges for Athletics Personnel and Sports Managers, 18 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 1, 1 (2008) (noting that Congress “acted to prevent sex discrimination in
educational settings when it passed Title IX” (emphasis added)).
145. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288–89.
146. Id. at 289. Justice Kennedy made a similar argument in his dissent in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 657–58 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy contended that a private damages action should not lie against a school board in cases of
student-on-student harassment: “The only certainty flowing from the majority’s decision is that
scarce resources will be diverted from educating our children . . . .” Davis, 526 U.S. at 657
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Later in his dissent, Justice Kennedy cited statistics reflecting the
potential costs that school districts could face as a result of the majority’s holding:
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There is also the potential for large and harmful damage awards because Title
IX damage recoveries are not capped.147
IV. CONCLUSION
Jurisprudential principles demand that Gebser be applied to Title IX
athletics lawsuits. Not requiring pre-litigation notice and opportunity to cure
in an area where Congress has been silent would be inconsistent with Title
IX’s express administrative enforcement mechanism. Further, the Supreme
Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence supports the application of Gebser to
Title IX athletics lawsuits. Since compliance with Title IX is a condition
placed on universities as a result of their federal funding, universities should
not be compelled to assume such high legal risk without any knowledge that
such discrimination was occurring.
The overwhelmingly positive effect that Title IX has had with respect to
promoting gender equality in intercollegiate athletics is well-documented.
Applying Gebser to Title IX athletics lawsuits would only build on this success
and allow universities to remedy allegedly discriminatory practices before
spending time, money, and effort on protracted litigation. This would in turn
enable universities to channel their resources and efforts to promoting gender
equity in educational programs.

The cost of defending against peer sexual harassment suits alone could overwhelm
many school districts . . . . [T]here are no damages caps on the judicially implied
private cause of action under Title IX. As a result, school liability in one peer sexual
harassment suit could approach, or even exceed, the total federal funding of many
school districts.
[Davis], for example, seeks damages of $500,000 in this
case . . . . Respondent school district received approximately $679,000 in federal aid in
1992–1993 . . . . The school district sued in Gebser received only $120,000 in federal
funds a year . . . . Indeed, the entire 1992–1993 budget of that district was only $ 1.6
million.
Id. at 680–81 (internal citations omitted).
147. Justice Kennedy’s fears have been realized to a degree. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. A.N. v. E.
Haven Bd. of Educ., 200 Fed. App’x 46, 47–49 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming jury award of $100,000
against a school board based on a student-on-student sexual harassment claim brought under Title
IX); Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258–64 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming
jury award of $220,000 against a school district based on a student-on-student sexual harassment
claim brought under Title IX); see also Rebecca A. Oleksy, Comment, Student-on-Student Sexual
Harassment: Preventing a National Problem on a Local Level, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 230, 261
(2001) (arguing that “[b]y capping monetary damages, a school board could [] use some of the
school’s money, which would have otherwise been awarded to the plaintiff, to implement
effective training programs aimed at preventing sexual harassment”).
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